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TO: Director Shaun Donovan, Office of Management and Budget  
FROM: Administrator Michelle Leonhart, Drug Enforcement Administration 
CC: Attorney General Erick Holder, Department of Justice 
CC: Acting Director Michael Botticelli, Office of National Drug Control Policy 
DATE: September 9, 2014.  
TOPIC:  Request for Increased Appropriations for Expansion of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, Sensitive Investigative Unit Program in Mexico 
and Central America.  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ACTION FORCING EVENT: 
A recent spike in violence in Mexico and Central America has weakened the 
already precarious rule of law and further destabilized the region.  Ongoing drug-
fueled violence is cited as one of the underlying causes of the recent influx of illegal 
immigration to the United States.1 Since 2008, the US Congress has appropriated 
$2.1 billion in support of the Merida Initiative and over $350 million for the Central 
American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) but corrupt law enforcement 
                                                             
1Gonzalez-Barrera, Ana, Krogstad, Jens Manuel, Lopez, Mark Hugo, “DHS: Violence, poverty, is driving children to flee Central 




institutions in Mexico and Central American as well as a lack of coordination by US 
agencies have limited the success of these programs. 2   
 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: 
Security is a pre-condition for sustainable development.  U.S. foreign 
assistance and training programs targeted at reforming and professionalizing 
Mexican and Central American law enforcement institutions in order to improve 
security in the region have been largely ineffective.  Merida Initiative and CARSI 
funding utilized to purchase equipment and provide training and technical 
assistance has had a questionable return on investment as these initiatives are being 
undermined by pervasive corruption.   In addition, the implementation of these 
training programs have been uncoordinated and confused by the US government.  A 
myriad of government agencies with varying levels of experience and many lacking 
long-term commitment and sustainable goals are working independently to provide 
equipment and training in a jumbled effort to reform and increase the capabilities of 
Mexican and Central American law enforcement institutions.3     
The need for training in the region is unquestionable.  Transparency 
International’s 2013 corruption perception index ranks Mexico as 106th out of 177 
ranked countries, Guatemala 123rd, El Salvador 83rd, Honduras 140th, compared to 
                                                             
2 US Department of State Website, “Merida Initiative.”  http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/. Accessed 9/08/14. 
3 Government Accounting Office, Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and 
Foreign Operations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, “FOREIGN POLICE 





the U.S. which was ranked 19th.4  In Mexico, only 13% of all crimes are reported 
because of the citizenry’s fear of police corruption. 5  This is understandable since 
over 80% of all homicides are never solved.6  In much of Central America the 
situation is even worse.   
The Northern Triangle countries of Central America, El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras, are experiencing an explosion in homicide rates.  A 2012 U.N. Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) study estimated that in 2012 Mexico had a homicide 
rate of 21.5 deaths per 100,000 habitants.  This was overshadowed by El Salvador’s 
rate of 41.2, Guatemala’s rate of 39.9 and Honduras’ rate of 90.4.7 
 Figure 1. 8 
The universal corruption in all of these countries’ law enforcement 
organizations combined with structural weaknesses and lack of capacity in criminal 
                                                             
4Transparency International Website, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013.”  http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/. 
Accessed 9/27/2014. 
5 Gobierno Federal de México, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geografía (INEGI), “2012 Encuesta Nacional de 
Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Publica.”    
6 Zepeda, Guillermo, “Seguridad y Justicia Penal en los Estados: 25 Indicadores de Nuestra Debilidad Institucional” México 
Evalúa, March 2012. 
7 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Global Study on Homicide 2013: Trends, Contexts, Data.” March 2014. 




justice institutions makes solving homicides nearly impossible and severely impacts 
any U.S. assistance and training initiatives.  
As of May 2013, over 19,000 police officers were trained under the Merida 
and CARSI Initiatives.9  The success or failure of these training programs is difficult 
to measure as metrics used by the U.S. State Department to judge the Merida 
Initiative and CARSI merely cite the quantity of officers trained and make no 
qualitative assessments.  Currently, there is no requirement to follow up with 
officers to determine if the training received has been retained and implemented.10  
In most U.S. training initiatives there is no further interaction with U.S. officials after 
an officer completes a training program.  
Another critical issue is the lack of continuity in U.S. sponsored training 
programs.  Officials in the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement (INL) normally serve a two-year term before rotating to a new 
position and rarely have an opportunity to properly brief their replacement.  This 
frequently leads to a duplication of effort and a repeat of past errors due to lack of 
continuity in personnel.11    
To exacerbate the problem, INL frequently utilizes contractors to implement 
training programs in Mexico and Central America whose motives are profit and 
whose previous experience in a municipal police department does not translate well 
                                                             
9U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, “U.S.-Mexico Security 
Cooperation: An Overview of the Merida Initiative 2008–Present.” 113th Congress., 1st session, CQ Congressional Transcripts, 
May 23, 2013. 
10 State Department, Office of Inspector General, “Inspection of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 





to the Latin American environment.  Contract companies also frequently utilize ex-
military officers whose training methods may not be appropriate for civilian police 
especially in critical areas such as the use of lethal force or evidence collection.  Even 
successful training initiatives such as the Mexican Federal Law Enforcement training 
center in San Luis de Potosi, where U.S. federal agents as well as state and local 
officers trained new Mexican Federal police recruits can be frustrated by a lack of 
support by the host nation government.   Many of the new officers trained in this 
program were not subsequently offered positions by the Mexican government due 
to a lack of funding or were purged during the change of administration in 2012.     
  
HISTORY:  
Police corruption in Mexico and Central America is not a new phenomenon.  
In fact, its roots can be traced back to Spanish colonial rule where officials in the 
new world paid the Crown for their position of colonial authority and then extracted 
a salary from the population in the form of bribes.  This tradition continues today in 
Mexico and Central America where poorly paid police officers supplement their 
salary in a similar manner.12   
Until recent history, endemic police corruption in Latin America was of little 
concern to the U.S. government.  This changed after World War II and the onset of 
the Cold War.  The U.S. government first began police training initiatives in Latin 
                                                             
12  Lomnitz, Claudio, “Understanding history of corruption in Mexico.” The University of Chicago Chronicle, Nov. 27, 1995, Vol. 




America in 1954 with the founding of the Overseas Internal Security Program.  This 
organization’s function was later moved into the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and named the Office of Public Safety (OPS) where it trained 
numerous Latin American police officers at locations in Panama and in Washington, 
DC.13   
The OPS training program was criticized as being an extension of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose primary focus at the time was to train police 
officers to fight communist insurgents in their respective countries.14  This anti-
communist emphasis led to allegations of misconduct and human rights abuses by 
OPS officials and resulted in Congress adding Section 660 to the 1961 Foreign 
Assistance Act.  Section 660 prohibited the use of foreign aid to support training 
programs for police, prisons or other institutions of justice.15  The unintended 
consequences of this law can arguably been seen in Latin America today.  Due to this 
prohibitive legislation, Congress must specifically authorize funding for every 
foreign police training activity on a case-by-case basis.   
The “War on Drugs” was arguably started under President Nixon in the 
1970’s; it was in the 1980’s and early 1990’s when large amounts of foreign aid 
were approved for the training and equipping of our foreign law enforcement 
partners.  One of the first major appropriations was H.R. 3611, the International 
Narcotics Control Act of 1989.  This bill provided $115 million for international 
                                                             
13Sylvan, David and Majeski, Stephen, “U.S. Foreign Policy in Perspective: Clients, Enemies, and Empire.” New York: Routledge, 
2009 
14 Ibid. 




narcotics control assistance and an additional $125 million for military and law 
enforcement assistance to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.16   
The initial focus of the war on drugs was on the Andean Region as it is the 
only area of the world where large-scale cocaine production is possible.  This is due 
to the unique stable climate and high altitude.  Aid to the region continued for years 
but changed significantly on March 9, 2000, when the 106th Congress, House 
Appropriations Committee, approved an emergency supplemental appropriations 
bill that included $1.4 billion in funding for counter-narcotics efforts in Colombia.17  
This funding commitment has continued to the present and is commonly referred to 
as Plan Colombia.  It is arguably the U.S. government’s most successful recent 
foreign assistance program and it is credited with bringing Colombia back from the 
brink of anarchy.18  In 2000, Colombia was faced with a situation similar to that of 
Mexico and Central America today with weak rule of law and rising homicide rates, 
much greater in per capita terms than what Mexico has experienced in recent years. 
A combination of political will by the Uribe Administration and U.S. foreign 
assistance, to include numerous training initiatives, allowed Colombia to bring 
down its notoriously high murder and kidnapping rates as well as reform its corrupt 
law enforcement institutions.19     
Despite not receiving direct funding in the Plan Colombia appropriations, the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) played a crucial role in the success of 
                                                             
16Public Law 101-231 
17 Public Law. 106-246 
18 O’Hanlon, Michael E., Petraeus, David, “The Success Story in Colombia”, Brookings Institution, September 24, 2013. 




this initiative.  Since 2000, the DEA more than doubled the amount of Special Agents 
working in country with Colombian security forces and more importantly it tripled 
the size of the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) Program.20   
The SIU program formally began in 1997 but the underlying concept was 
born in the hunt for the notorious drug kingpin, Pablo Escobar.  The Colombian 
National Police, with the assistance and direction of the DEA, formed a special police 
unit to hunt Escobar called the Search Block (Bloque de Busqueda).  In an effort to 
root out the pervasive corruption that was thwarting efforts to capture Escobar, 
officers assigned to this special unit were required to pass a U.S. administered 
polygraph examination and background check.  This vetting provided the DEA a 
reliable partner with whom they could share sensitive intelligence and conduct joint 
operations.  The program worked and Escobar was gunned down on a rooftop while 
attempting to escape capture in 1993.21  The Colombian Search Block continued to 
demonstrate the success of this operational model and quickly tracked down and 
captured Gilberto and Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela, the undisputed leaders of the Cali 
Cartel in 1995.   
The success of the program did not go unnoticed and in 1997 Congress 
appropriated $20 million for the formation of similar special police units in Mexico, 
Bolivia, Peru as well as Colombia and formally named the program the SIU.22  Today, 
despite no augmentation in funding, the DEA-SIU program operates in thirteen 
                                                             
20 Section Chief Valerie Nickerson, DEA Office of Global Enforcement, interviewed by author, Arlington, VA, December 1, 2015. 
21 Bowden, Mark, “Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw” New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001 
22 U.S. Department Of Justice, Office Of The Inspector General Audit Division, “The Drug Enforcement Administration’s 




different countries; Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Paraguay, Dominican 
Republic, Panama, Guatemala, Honduras, Thailand, Afghanistan, Ghana and 
Nigeria.23   
While Plan Colombia never directly appropriated funding for the DEA-SIU 
program, some money trickled down through INL and assisted in financially 
supporting these specialized units.  Today, Colombia boasts eight SIU units and over 
300 officers in the program.  Two of the top eight police generals in Colombia are 
SIU veterans and alumni of the mandatory five-week training program held at the 
DEA Academy in Quantico.24 
   Despite being formed in 1997, the Mexican SIU program is only just 
recently beginning to show results similar to those achieved in Colombia.  The 
relationship between the U.S. and Mexican governments is significantly different.  
The secession of Texas and the U.S.-Mexican War of 1846 still looms large in the 
psyche of Mexican officials.   The kidnapping, torture and murder of DEA Special 
Agent Enrique Camarena in 1985, is still fresh in the memory of DEA and other U.S. 
law enforcement officials.  Special Agent Camarena was kidnapped by his Mexican 
police counterparts and turned over to drug traffickers after spearheading a 
successful investigation that led to the seizure and destruction of a massive 
marijuana plantation in Mexico.  When the Mexican government refused to assist in 
efforts to capture the responsible parties, the DEA took decisive action and forcibly 
produced several of the perpetrators of Agent Camerana’s murder in U.S. court.   
                                                             
23 Section Chief Valerie Nickerson, DEA Office of Global Enforcement, interviewed by author, Arlington, VA, December 1, 2015. 




While this action is credited with making the work of DEA agents abroad 
safer, it damaged the DEA and the U.S. government’s relationship with Mexico for 
many years.  The close collaboration enjoyed between DEA agents and Colombian 
National Police officers that made the SIU program so successful in Colombia does 
not exist in Mexico.  Presently, all US federal law enforcement officers working in 
Mexico are prohibited by the Mexican Government from carrying firearms, a 
privilege which is enjoyed by U.S. federal law enforcement officers in most Latin 
American countries.  
Despite this complex history, there has been a vast improvement in the U.S. 
government’s relationship with Mexican law enforcement authorities.  The change 
slowly began in 2000 when Vicente Fox of the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) 
won the presidency and broke the Partido Revolucionario Institucional’s (PRI) 
seventy-one year strangle hold on power.  His successor, President Felipe Calderon, 
also of the PAN, took a very aggressive stance against narco-traffickers and made 
use of Mexican military commandos to conduct high value target capture operations 
with great success.  There was some trepidation with the 2012 return to power of 
the PRI but, President Enrique Peña Nieto has maintained the close collaboration of 
Mexican and U.S. security officials.  This has resulted in a string of high value targets 
being captured, the most significant being the recent capture of Joaquin “Chapo” 
Guzman on February 22, 2014.25   
                                                             
25 DEA Website Press Release,” Dept. of Justice Statement on the Arrest of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera” February 22, 




Until recently, scant attention had been paid to Central America since the fall 
of the Iron Curtain.  Guatemala and El Salvador suffered through horrible civil wars 
in the 1980’s where the U.S. backed anti-communist government forces.  During this 
era, El Salvador received more U.S. foreign aid than any other country in Latin 
American as it fought against the leftist, Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(FMLN). 26  Although Honduras did not experience an outright civil war, it shared 
with its neighbors years of military dictatorship followed by fledgling democracies 
in the mid-1990s that were heavily influenced by powerful military leaders.  Instead 
of promoting and fostering these new democratic neighbors, the U.S. largely ignored 
them.    
  The attention of the U.S. was drawn again to the northern triangle of Central 
America as successful anti-narcotics efforts in the Caribbean as well as in Colombia, 
Peru and Mexico pushed cocaine trafficking routes into Central America and caused 
the rapid escalation of homicide rates in the region.  This “balloon effect” resulted in 
one particularly heavily exploited route where traffickers dispatched small aircraft 
loaded with cocaine from Venezuela to the remote eastern coast of Honduras.  In 
response, the DEA and its newly formed Honduran SIU unit, with support from U.S. 
State Department helicopters stationed in Guatemala, initiated Operation Anvil.  
Under Operation Anvil, intelligence regarding suspected flights gathered from U.S. 
and Colombian radar stations was provided to Honduran security officials in order 
to coordinate and assist Honduran narcotics interdiction efforts.   
                                                             
26 Ribando Seelke, Clare, “El Salvador: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service, 




The program was successful and resulted in over 4.7 tons of cocaine being 
seized and a vast reduction in suspect flights to Honduras.27  However, significant 
problems with the program arose as Honduran pilots began shooting down 
uncooperative aircraft in violation of their official protocols and international law.  
In addition to the unauthorized shooting of civilian aircraft, a DEA led Honduran 
interdiction team was involved in a highly publicized shoot out with narcotics 
traffickers during an Operation Anvil mission on May 11th, 2012, in which four 
civilians were killed.  These events led Senator Patrick Leahy to sponsor an effort to 
partially suspend foreign aid to Honduras and cancel further Operation Anvil 
missions.28   
While Guatemala has not received the recent intense scrutiny of Honduras, 
the government did also make headlines in May of 2013 when they authorized the 
extradition of former president Alfonso Portillo to the Southern District of New York 
for narcotics related money laundering charges.29  Guatemala formed a small SIU 
unit of approximately 50 members in 2005, which was credited with assisting in the 
investigation of former President Portillo.  El Salvador does not currently have a 
DEA-SIU team and only recently passed legislation authorizing wiretaps.  It does 
host the US State Department’s International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) that 
provides advanced law enforcement training to officers through out all of Latin 
                                                             
27 Damien Cave and Ginger Thompson, “U.S. Rethinks a Drug War After Deaths in Honduras,” New York Times, October 12, 
2012. 
28 Ibid. 




America.  It was established in 2005 and has trained almost 6,000 officers since that 
time.30       
 
BACKGROUND: 
The DEA-SIU program currently provides equipment, training and 
investigative collaboration and oversight to over 1,000 officers located in 13 
different countries.  The program in each country continues to grow as each SIU unit 
continues to slowly increase the number of vetted SIU officers.  This increase in 
personnel has only been possible because INL offices in each SIU participant country 
have financially assisted the DEA with the ever-growing operational costs to 
administer these units. 31     
The repercussions of the government sequester and subsequent budget cuts 
are still being felt government wide.   These spending cuts forced the DEA to reduce 
allocations to all of its programs and the SIU program was no exception.   Despite 
these budgetary reductions, the DEA continued to expand the SIU program and in FY 
2014 a new DEA-SIU unit was formed in Nigeria.  West Africa has become of critical 
strategic importance not only because of the increasing threat of radical Islam in the 
region but, it also has become the preferred transit point for Colombian cocaine 
entering European markets.  Weak governments and pliable law enforcement 
institutions have attracted drug traffickers who exploit the region’s instability.  One 
                                                             
30 ILEA website, “ILEA San Salvador: Statistics” http://www.ileass.org.sv/page.php?id=16. Accessed 10/04/2014 




of the U.S. government’s responses to this rule of law crisis was to form a DEA-SIU 
unit.  This policy option was only fiscally possible because the Department of 
Defense (DOD) provided the initial startup costs for the unit, which are estimated at 
$800,000 to $1 million dollars.  These expenses include everything from the 
purchase of vehicles and office equipment to the costs of U.S. administered 
polygraphs to vet members of the unit.32   
The Department of State and the Department of Defense have the vast 
majority of funding allocated to them for worldwide counter-narcotics training and 
assistance.  In fiscal years 2010 and 2011, these two departments provided 98% of 
all funding for foreign police assistance and training programs.33 Funding to support 
overseas training programs for both INL and DOD has steadily decreased in recent 
years.  In FY 2013, INL received 1.9 billion and only 1.4 billion in FY 2104.  For FY 
2015, the State Department has only requested 1.1 billion.34  DOD was allocated 1.5 
billion in FY 2014 for international counterdrug activities and is also expected to 
reduce its expenditures in FY 2015.35     
The example of Nigeria is demonstrative of how the DEA has managed to 
expand the SIU program despite zero increases in appropriations.  With the 
exception of the SIU program, chemical diversion, and asset forfeiture training, the 
DEA receives no allocation to conduct overseas training.  The Department of State or 
the Department of Defense must choose to utilize the DEA to fulfill a training 
                                                             
32 Section Chief Valerie Nickerson, DEA Office of Global Enforcement, interviewed by author, Arlington, VA, December 1, 2015. 
33 GAO Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, “FOREGIEN POLICE ASSISTANCE; Defined Roles 
and Improved Information Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration.”  May 2012 
34 State Department, Office of Inspector General, “Inspection of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs.” ISP-I-14-24. September 2014.    




objective and then transfer funding through an Inter-Agency Agreement (IAA) or a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).36  These inefficient and cumbersome 
mechanisms to transfer funding between agencies can take nine months to execute 
and have caused multiple training events to be postponed or canceled because 
funding was not transferred in sufficient time.  Because of this unwieldy system, INL 
de-obligated $503 million and returned $58 million to the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury in FY 2013.37    
Another issue with funding for law enforcement and counter-narcotics 
training being provided to the DOD and State Department is that it can misalign 
agency priorities.  What the DOD sees as a strategic priority may not be of the same 
concern to the DEA or INL.  The example of Nigeria was a rare example of when all 
three agencies agreed upon the need for a DEA-SIU unit and provided funding for 
the corresponding training and infrastructure.  However, the DOD frequently 
utilizes counter-narcotics training programs as a means to gain access into countries 
that for political reasons would not accept military assistance and training but are 
willing to accept law enforcement, counter-narcotics training.  As a current example, 
the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi is working with the DEA International Training Section in 
Quantico, Virginia, to host and train a group of Vietnamese narcotics police 
officers.38  Given the history of U.S.-Vietnamese relations, this training initiative 
would not be politically acceptable if sponsored by the DOD.  DEA’s international 
                                                             
36 Assistant Special Agent in Charge James Farnsworth, DEA Office of International Training, interviewed by author, Quantico, 
VA, November 4, 2014.  
37 State Department, Office of Inspector General, “Inspection of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs.” ISP-I-14-24. September 2014.    
38Assistant Special Agent in Charge James Farnsworth, DEA Office of International Training, interviewed by author, Quantico, 




training program is frequently used by DOD to establish a beachhead in burgeoning 
security relationships with nations.  While this is not an unproductive use of agency 
resources, it does stretch the DEA’s limited training capacity to non-source and non-
transit countries of U.S. bound narcotics.   
A prime example of this is Afghanistan; a country that is a major 
international supplier of heroin but that has arguably a limited impact on the U.S. 
market.  Yet, since the inception of the war, DOD has spent over $2 billion on 
counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.39 Through DOD funding, the DEA has 
become heavily invested in Afghanistan.  There are currently more than 40 DEA 
Special Agents permanently assigned to Afghanistan in addition to the Foreign 
Deployed Advisory and Assistance Team (FAST), which performs joint counter-
narcotics operations with DOD forces.  The DOD funds the FAST as well as other 
DEA operations in Afghanistan to include a massive counter-narcotics training 
program.  The program utilizes contract instructors to run training programs for the 
Afghan National Police.  The main focus of this training initiative is two specialized 
units that work daily with the DEA, the Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU) and the 
Afghan SIU unit.  The NIU and SIU as well as the training facility are all physically 
located on the same compound as the DEA Kabul Country Office.  This creates 
increased interaction between DEA and NIU/SIU personnel and allows DEA to 
better assess the need and impact of training programs.40  A Special Agent from the 
DEA Office of International Training supervises the contract instructors, many of 
                                                             
39Statement for the Record, Erin Logan, Principal Director for Counter-Narcotics and Global Threats, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control “Future U.S. Counter-Narcotics Efforts in Afghanistan”. 
January 15, 2014.     
40 Assistant Special Agent in Charge James Farnsworth, DEA Office of International Training, interviewed by author, Quantico, 




who are former DEA Special Agents or state and local officers who have experience 
working on a DEA task force.  Since its inception, over 20,000 Afghans officers have 
been trained and DOD considers the program a success.41 
The DEA’s Office of International Training (TRI) is located within the DEA’s 
Training Academy, which shares the same grounds as the FBI Academy in Quantico, 
Virginia.  Three dedicated teams of Special Agent Instructors are solely responsible 
for conducting international training programs.  The DEA has the largest overseas 
presence of any federal law enforcement agency with approximately ten percent of 
its workforce or over 500 Special Agents stationed in U.S. Embassies and Consulates 
worldwide.  With the exceptions of marijuana and methamphetamine, narcotics are 
mainly produced abroad and smuggled into the United States.  Since the Agency’s 
inception in 1973, the DEA has always maintained a strong overseas presence in 
drug producer and principal transit nations.  Because of this emphasis, Mexico is 
one of the DEA’s largest foreign posts with over 60 Special Agents assigned to 10 
different offices.  El Salvador is the smallest office with only 3 assigned Special 
Agents.  Guatemala currently has 6 Special Agents and 4 are assigned to the US 
Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras.42    
The DEA’s relationship with INL and DOD in each of these offices is complex 
and varies greatly by Embassy.  The DEA, as all other U.S. agencies located in an 
embassy, are not allowed to perform any procurement and must rely upon the State 
Department to process government purchase orders.  In order to administer an SIU 
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unit overseas, the DEA transfers the majority of its funding to the State Department, 
usually the INL office, who then holds the money in a reimbursable account (RA).  
This can lead to confusion as INL frequently provides DEA additional funding for 
certain other State Department initiatives.  As personnel in DEA and INL rotate in 
and out of country, confusion can occur and INL officials sometimes comingle 
accounts and/or assume that the DEA-SIU funding is their own.  INL officials 
sometimes then require DEA Special Agents to write lengthy proposals to justify 
“grants” in order to spend DEA-SIU money because it is located in an INL account.  
All too often strong personalities in both agencies exacerbate this problem.43   
Unlike Afghanistan, where the DOD provides funding for the DEA to 
independently administer counter-narcotics training initiatives, INL maintains 
control of all police training activities in Mexico and Central America.  For FY 2015, 
State Department has requested $115 million for the Merida Initiative and $130 
million for the CARSI.44  INL offices in Mexico and Central America will sometimes 
utilize this funding to sponsor DEA training programs but it is on an ad hoc basis.  
INL prefers to utilize contract companies in order to perform the majority of its 
training initiatives.45   
The preference for contractors to fulfill training obligations is not unique to 
INL.  The Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Program (ICITAP) utilizes contract instructors to conduct the majority of 
                                                             
43 Section Chief Valerie Nickerson, DEA Office of Global Enforcement, interviewed by author, Arlington, VA, December 1, 2015. 
44 US Department of State Website. “Merida Initiative.”  http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/. Accessed 9/08/14 
45 Government Accounting Office, Report to the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and 
Foreign Operations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, “FOREIGN POLICE 
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its training worldwide.46  The quality of training provided by contract companies 
differs greatly and the success of any contract company varies by the level of 
government oversight, feedback and input.  The DOD counter-narcotics training 
program that the DEA oversees in Afghanistan utilizes contract instructors but there 
is constant interaction and supervision since the contractors are co-located on a 
base with the DEA country office.  In addition, the NIU and SIU officers who receive 
the majority of the training are co-located on the same compound, which allows for 
constant interaction with DEA agents and a continuous albeit informal review of the 
effectiveness of the training program.47  
Under the Merida and CARSI initiatives in Mexico and Central America, INL 
has utilized the DEA to participate in several training initiatives such as the Mexican 
Federal Law Enforcement training center in San Luis de Potosi.  The DEA also 
continues to support the State Department’s International Law Enforcement 
Academy (ILEA) in El Salvador.  However, neither the DEA nor any other U.S. federal 
law enforcement agency has been tasked by INL to run a long term, sustained, 
training initiative in the region.  In order to utilize Merida Initiative or CARSI 
funding, the DEA and INL must author a lengthy and complicated IAA or MOU for 
every individual training event.  The result is that the DEA as well as other federal 
law enforcement agencies rarely utilize Merida or CARSI funding for training and 
INL continues to use contractors to accomplish training initiatives.   
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Accessed 10/22/14.  
47 Assistant Special Agent in Charge James Farnsworth, DEA Office of International Training, interviewed by author, Quantico, 





POLICY PROPOSAL:   
 In order to support the Administration’s stated goal of providing partner 
nations with assistance to build sustainable capacity to address justice sector 
security challenges, the DEA is proposing an increase for its FY 2016 discretionary 
budget authority request to fund the expansion of the SIU program and a dedicated, 
DEA led counter-narcotics training program in Mexico and Central America.48  
An increase in the DEA’s appropriation in the 2016, Commerce, Justice, 
Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill would allow the DEA to augment 
existing SIU programs in Mexico, Honduras and Guatemala and to establish a new 
SIU unit in El Salvador.   In FY 2014, the DEA was appropriated approximately $2 
billion of which $417 million supported foreign operations to include the SIU 
program; for FY 2105, there has been no requested change in funding. 49    An 
increase to the DEA’s budget in the 2016 appropriations bill of $40 million, 
dedicated for foreign operations, would allow the DEA to double funding for the SIU 
program from $20 million to $40 million, add $10 million for independent training 
initiatives in Mexico and Central America and $10 million to support corresponding 
infrastructure to include equipment and an increase in personnel costs for 
additional Special Agents assigned to the region.      
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An augmentation to the DEA’s baseline budget in order to expand the SIU 
program and to conduct independent training initiatives in Mexico and Central 
America has several advantages and disadvantages as an approach to help resolve 
the rule of law crisis in the region.  Addressing rule of law concerns is a very long-
term proposition.  The best example of the positive, long-term, effects of the SIU 
program is the example of the Colombian National Police.  The progress made in 
Colombia is palpable but it took 20 years to achieve the limited successes attained 
today.  The Colombian government reported that between 2000 and 2007 the 
number of murders and kidnappings were reduced by at least one-third.50   
However, as the Government Accounting Office (GAO) cites in their report “PLAN 
COLOMBIA; Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; 
U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance”, it is difficult to 
accurately assess justice sector reform efforts in Colombia.    
Advantages: 
The SIU program has a 20-year proven track record and is considered by 
Congress to be the gold standard in vetted police units.51  The principal reason for 
the success of the program is the oversight of DEA Agent Advisors who live in 
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country and work with SIU officers on a daily basis.  The DEA maintains a 15 to 1 
ratio of SIU officers to DEA Agent Advisors.52  This restricts SIU units to a 
manageable size, which allows DEA Agents to more easily interact and mentor 
officers in their unit.   
After graduating the mandatory 5-week, SIU Basic Training program in 
Quantico, Virginia, officers continue to build upon that knowledge as they work in 
the field with DEA Agents assigned to U.S. Embassies and consulates in program 
sponsor countries.  This relationship provides continuous reinforcement of the 
professional investigative skill set SIU officers acquired in Quantico as well as a 
strong anti-corruption measure.  Oversight, combined with the mandatory 
polygraph requirement have been the key to keeping corruption in the SIU program 
to a level far lower than what is typically found in each participant country’s non-
SIU narcotics units.53  
After a 5-year tour of duty in an SIU, a host nation officer is subsequently 
required to rotate out to a different assignment.54  At this point, they are 
professionally developed and capable of taking on a management role and sharing 
their training and experience with police colleagues in other divisions.  The USAID 
cites this positive effect in “A Field Guide for USAID Democracy and Governance 
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Officers: Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement in Developing Countries” training 
manual: 
“From the national security perspective, the FBI or DEA may intend to improve host-country 
investigative skill in narcotics or human trafficking cases. Often, high quality training and other 
support are provided. From the developmental perspective, those newly acquired skills can become 
part of an integrated program that reforms civilian police supervision, management, 
policy/procedure and other institutional elements. Only through this coordinated country approach 
way can host country civilian police absorb new skills and build capability to, not just investigate but, 
effectively manage the investigative function as part of a comprehensive reform plan. Improved 
management increases the likelihood that sustained change, new knowledge and new skills will be 
disseminated throughout the agency.”55 
The DEA has witnessed several ex-SIU officers rise to the rank of Colonel and 
General in their respective National Police forces.   Trusted and experienced SIU 
officers have been utilized as police trainers who augment DEA staff in training 
programs in Latin America.  This could potentially be a very effective and 
sustainable model that could be replicated in future training efforts to improve rule 
of law throughout Latin America.   
The SIU program also provides other positive knock on effects.  As former 
SIU officers spread across their countries acting in their new post-SIU assignments 
they informally act as intelligence assets and report back to former colleagues in the 
SIU or directly to DEA agents about potential narcotics investigative leads or other 
relevant law enforcement concerns.   
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In addition, SIU units become not only the DEA’s but the whole U.S. 
government’s “go to” unit for any sensitive law enforcement issues such as the 
kidnapping or murder of a U.S. diplomat.  SIU officers quickly respond to U.S. 
government concerns and bring to bear their advanced investigative skills.  The 
recent example of the capture, extradition and prosecution of the taxicab robbers 
who killed DEA Special Agent Terry Watson in Bogota, Colombia, is demonstrative.56     
DEA agents stationed abroad do not exclusively interact with SIU officers but 
maintain relationships with other relevant law enforcement or military entities.  
This on the ground engagement allows the DEA to appropriately select units and 
personnel who would most benefit from U.S. sponsored training.  Though there isn’t 
the formal relationship as with the SIU program, the officers selected and trained by 
DEA frequently maintain continued interaction with Special Agents stationed in 
their country.  This provides a level of oversight and sustainability that is a crucial 
element to the success of any training initiative.  DEA Agents in country are better 
able to design and implement effective training programs as they know their 
audience more intimately than their INL or DOD counterparts.  DEA Agents are also 
able to follow up training by directly providing agency funding to support newly 
trained officers in their investigative efforts.  DEA Agents can then monitor 
subsequent investigative activity and ensure that officers are implementing the 
training they have received.     
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 The other major advantage of direct engagement of the DEA in Mexican and 
Central American training is the relevant experience of DEA personnel.  Since DEA 
has the largest foreign presence of any other federal law enforcement agency, it also 
has the largest cadre of Special Agents with experience working overseas.  This 
understanding of other cultures as well as foreign legal systems is critical when 
developing and implementing overseas police training programs.  The experience of 
working investigations in Latin American criminal justice systems is almost unique 
to DEA and is a by-product of the agency’s strong overseas presence. 
Contract companies that provide foreign police instruction frequently hire 
ex-US state and local officers or military officers whose experience and teaching 
methods don’t always translate well into the Latin American environment.  Poor 
quality of instruction can also be an issue.  INL officers frequently are not present 
during training programs and if they are in attendance, most lack the expertise to 
recognize when a contract police instructor is teaching a tactic incorrectly.57   
Motivation is also quite different for contractors versus DEA agents.  While 
contractor’s motives are mercenary in nature, DEA agent instructors tend to care 
more about the results of their training programs because of professional pride and 
the reality that they or a colleague may be relying on these newly trained officers in 
a tactical or investigative situation in the very near future.  While some of these 
concerns can be alleviated by proper oversight and selection of contract companies, 
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the overutilization of contractors by State Department and DOD in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is already an issue currently under scrutiny by Congress.58   
 
Disadvantages: 
Utilizing the DEA to deliver these training programs is not without its 
drawbacks.  A problem that is inherent in many justice sector reform proposals is 
the inability to create an accurate performance metric.   Like many other rule of law 
policy proposals, the SIU program also lacks an accurate system to measure success.  
This deficiency was addressed in a 2007 Department of Justice, Office of the 
Inspector General Report that stated the following: 
“We found that the DEA was unable to empirically demonstrate the accomplishments of its 
SIU program as a whole. For example, the DEA does not collect and analyze activity statistics 
attributable to its SIU Program, such as arrests, the number of surveillance operations, or efforts tied 
to a CPOT or a PTO investigation. Additionally, the DEA has not evaluated the collective effect of the 
SIU Program. While we recognize that the investigative activities of the SIUs are often run by the host 
country, we believe the DEA should collect and analyze appropriate empirical data relating to the 
accomplishments of the SIUs.”59 
 Measuring the impact of this proposal could therefore also prove 
problematic, especially in the short-run, as the positive effects on rule of law of the 
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SIU program are even more difficult to properly measure and take years to become 
visible.   
Another principal limitation to this proposal is the size of the DEA and its 
limited training capacity.  The international training section only has 15 Special 
Agents and drawing from the domestic instructor staff is not a feasible option.  The 
DEA Academy currently can barely keep pace with the demand to train new DEA 
personnel.60  The already challenging staffing issues that the DEA is suffering would 
be compounded by an expanded requirement to station more agents overseas and 
to increase the international training section.   
The Mexican Federal Police is a massive law enforcement institution with 
over 37,000 officers.  As stated, time is needed for the beneficial influences of the 
SIU program to have an effect on a whole police institution.  Increasing the size of 
the SIU program would of course speed up the process but only to a limited extent.   
The issue remains of the almost 500,000 state and local police agents in Mexico that 
are in desperate need of training and rule of law reform.61  The magnitude of the 
training initiative needed is beyond the scale that the DEA could independently 
provide.  
Another drawback is that while the DEA can provide instructors who are 
experts in narcotics investigations, tactics, informant handling, evidence collection 
and other related topics such as money laundering, weapons trafficking and 
terrorism, the organization lacks appropriate instructors for subjects such as anti-
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riot or community policing techniques.  Therefore, the DEA’s participation and 
impact on a major police training initiatives is limited to counter-narcotics and 
related subjects.62      
As previously stated, the key to the SIU program’s success is the oversight 
provided by DEA Special Agents stationed abroad.  If the SIU was expanded in 
Mexico and Central America, the DEA would be required to post more agents 
overseas in order to maintain the 15 to 1 ratio of SIU members to Special Agent 
Advisors.  Not only does the DEA currently lack the personnel but this new staffing 
requirement would carry significant reoccurring costs.  Special Agents assigned to 
diplomatic posts require increased Department of State, International Cooperative 
Administrative Support Service (ICASS) charges, as well as housing and schooling 
allowances.  This request for an increase in FY 2016 appropriations would therefore 
cause the DEA to require more discretionary spending in future budgets. 
Another concern is that as a primarily domestic law enforcement institution, 
international training could be considered a secondary concern and not made a 
priority by future senior management.  Allocations made directly to the DEA’s 
discretionary budget run the risk of being re-tasked to support other initiatives.  
While funds remain in INL or DOD control, there is no risk of them being utilized to 
support domestic DEA programs.63    
The chief disadvantage of providing the DEA funding to run independent 
training initiatives in Mexico and Central America is that it could potentially violate 
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the purpose statute (31 U.S. Code § 1301).64 This law assists Congress in tracking 
and assessing how effectively taxpayer dollars are utilized.  Since Congress has 
already provided funding under the Merida and CARSI initiatives for law 
enforcement training programs in Mexico and Central America, the existing funds 
should be transferred from the Department of State to the DEA instead of a new 
appropriation being committed for the same purpose.   
 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS: 
The idea of expanding the DEA-SIU program in Mexico and Central America 
is not new and was suggested by the United States Senate Caucus On International 
Narcotics Control in 2011 and received bi-partisan support: 
“Recommendation: To counter the threat of Mexican drug trafficking organizations in 
Central America, the current Sensitive Investigative Unit programs in Central America – 
currently in Guatemala and Panama – should be expanded to additional countries.”65 
The Senate Drug Caucus reiterated its support for the SIU program in 2012 when it 
suggested the program’s expansion into the Caribbean: 
“The Caucus believes that some of DEA’s best work worldwide is done through its Sensitive 
Investigative Units (SIUs). This has been the case in Central America, Mexico and 
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Afghanistan. The Caucus believes that the SIU model that has been effective in other parts of 
the world should be replicated in the Caribbean.”66 
Both Republicans and Democrats have recognized the need to support rule of 
law programs in Mexico and Central America.  The Merida Initiative initially passed 
the House in 2008 with 311 votes, 203 Democratic and 108 Republicans supporting 
the bill.67   It has continued to be funded to the present under a Democratic 
Administration and a Republican controlled House of Representatives.  
This budget request avoids the sensitive issue of state marijuana legalization 
and federal enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act.  The DEA’s ability to 
provide oversight of U.S. training programs due to its existing “boots on the ground” 
and expertise in the region would likely gain bi-partisan support given the current 
regional crisis and previous support for the SIU program.  
 With the impending retirement of Attorney General Holder, there is the 
potential for upheaval in the Department of Justice and a change in priorities.  
However, a new Attorney General should support this proposal as it falls within the 
White House’s stated U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy.   This policy has four 
stated goals: 
“1. Help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges, 
specifically to:  disrupt and defeat transnational threats; sustain legitimate and effective 
public safety, security, and justice sector institutions; support legitimate self-defense; 
contribute to U.S. or partner military operations which may have urgent requirements; 
maintain control of their territory and jurisdiction waters including air, land, and sea 
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borders; and help indigenous forces assume greater responsibility for operations where U.S. 
military forces are present.  
 
2. Promote partner support for U.S. interests, through cooperation on national, regional, and 
global priorities, including, but not limited to, such areas as:  military access to airspace and 
basing rights; improved interoperability and training opportunities; and cooperation on law 
enforcement, counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, combating organized crime and arms 
trafficking, countering Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation, and terrorism, 
intelligence, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts.  
 
3. Promote universal values, such as good governance, transparent and accountable 
oversight of security forces, rule of law, transparency, accountability, delivery of fair and 
effective justice, and respect for human rights.  
 
4. Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations, 
including by helping to build the capacity of troop- and police-contributing nations to United 
Nations and other multilateral peacekeeping missions, as well as through regional exercises, 




An expansion of the DEA-SIU program in Mexico and Central America as well 
as DEA led training initiatives in the region satisfies these policy goals and would 
likely receive support from any new incoming Attorney General.      
The greater possibilities for political hurdles are those potentially imposed 
by the larger, more influential, federal agencies, namely the Department of State and 
the DOD.  The prospect of the DOD opposing the expansion of the SIU or impeding 
DEA led training initiatives in Mexico and Central America is unlikely.  The DOD 
currently funds a group of contract instructors that work with the DEA’s 
International Training Section.  This unit, called the Global Training Team, is 
currently tasked with providing counter-narcotics training programs in Africa and 
Central Asia.69  The DOD has a history of partnering with the DEA as evidenced by 
the Department’s support for the FAST teams and the massive training program in 
Afghanistan.  The DOD’s legacy in Mexico and Central America is quite complex and 
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any potential increase in U.S. influence as well as professionalization of police forces 
accomplished by the DEA would benefit the DOD’s regional objectives. 
The Department of State, INL Bureau, is tasked with the distribution, 
allocation, and expenditure of all Merida Initiative and CARSI funding.  Given the 
Bureau’s long-standing support for existing SIU units, they would probably support 
an expansion of the program in the region.  However, they would almost certainly 
oppose independent DEA training activities.  Part of the Department of State’s 
mandate is to perform foreign training activities.  They view themselves as the 
experts in development, capacity building and rule of law initiatives.  While the INL 
Bureau is willing to provide funds for one-time, specific, counter-narcotics training 
events, they would not provide a significant amount of funding for the DEA to 
manage a large scale, regional security sector training initiative.  This topic was 
addressed in a 2012, GAO Report; “Foreign Police Assistance: Defined Roles and 
Improved Information Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration.” 
“According to the DOJ officials, DOJ should have a greater role in this process. Such a role is 
consistent with the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review which directs State to look first 
to DOJ, DHS, and DOD to implement State programs involving counterterrorism capacity building, 
foreign law enforcement, or strengthening justice and interior ministries, according to the DOJ 
officials. However, the DOJ officials said the issue was not resolved and committee discussions 
primarily concerned the responsibilities and authorities of State and DOD. According to a DHS 
official, DHS also asserts that State should consider DHS when allocating security sector assistance 




State is reluctant to expand the authorities of other agencies to administer security sector assistance 
activities.”70 
The US Agency for International Aid (USAID), a related but technically 
independent agency that follows State Department policy guidelines 71, literally 
wrote a book on training foreign police: A Field Guide For USAID Democracy And 
Governance Officers: Assistance To Civilian Law Enforcement In Developing 
Countries.72  It was USAID that was originally tasked with foreign police training in 
the 60’s and continues to do so today.73  Their own publication cites the need and 
benefits of leveraging the experience of other federal agencies.  
 “It is important to develop and maintain strong collaborative relationships with those USG 
agencies engaged in civilian police assistance. Much can be learned from their experience. 
Opportunities to integrate projects will often present themselves. Sometimes, all that is needed is a 
bit of creative thinking to coordinate or even integrate financial and programming resources to 
achieve a country team coordinated approach that can save money and improve results.”74   
 The relationship between State Department and the DEA is complex.  While 
there is little interaction between USAID and the DEA, there is a very close 
relationship between the DEA and INL.  The DEA requires INL support to process 
and perform procurement for any DEA led training programs in Mexico and Central 
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America.  Therefore, an expansion of the SIU program would also require “buy in” by 
INL as they perform key functions to administer the SIU program.  State Department 
support for an expansion of the SIU program is also critical as they would be 
required to go through the difficult, bureaucratic, process of requesting 
authorization for additional DEA Special Agents to be stationed as diplomats from 
the host nation government.  The host nation government would also be required to 
supply additional national police officers to staff an expanded or new SIU program.75     
 An expansion of the existing SIU programs would likely be authorized in 
Guatemala.  The Senate Drug Caucus suggested this very action.76 The Guatemalan 
government is already very supportive of the program and given the difficulties it is 
facing from domestic as well as Colombian and Mexican organized crime groups, it 
likely would welcome additional DEA agents.  Honduras faces similar problems and 
is in perhaps even more dire need of assistance than Guatemala however, the 
addition of more DEA agents to the Tegucigalpa Office may face significant 
opposition from Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont.  His position on the Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies 
would make this proposal very difficult to pass without his support.  He has 
spearheaded the oversight committee investigation into Operation Anvil and 
partially suspended foreign assistance to Honduras pending a full investigation into 
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the DEA’s participation in this operation.77  The Department of Justice, Office of the 
Inspector General is currently still investigating the matter.78 
It is difficult to determine the current mindset of the Peña-Nieto 
Administration and how they would receive the proposal to expand the SIU 
program.  The Mexican government has never visibly supported the U.S. playing a 
large role in their domestic law enforcement programs.  In contrast to their rhetoric, 
the previous PAN and the current PRI Administration have quietly allowed the DEA 
to operate one of its largest SIU units.  Albeit with less access and direct 
participation enjoyed by the DEA in other Latin American countries.   
The Mexican SIU program has recently demonstrated very promising results 
as evidenced by the recent capture of Joaquin “Chapo” Guzman on February 22, 
2014.79   Though the Navy executed the capture operation, the SIU played a crucial 
role in the development of intelligence and debilitating his organization with the 
death of Gonzalo Inzunza Inzunza, aka “Macho Prieto”, Chapo Guzman’s head of 
security who was killed in an SIU led operation.80  Given these successes and the 
problems Mexico is currently facing, it would seem in the Mexican government’s 
interests to expand the SIU program.  However, the requirement to have more DEA 
agents stationed and operating on Mexican soil touches a sensitive political nerve 
and is a contentious issue.    
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Given the recent government sequestration, there is little appetite in 
Washington for agencies to increase their base line funding.  The DEA complied with 
this sentiment and submitted their FY 2015 budget request and asked for no 
additional funding.  However, the response from the House of Representatives was 
indicative of their strong support for the efforts of the DEA overseas. 
“DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION SALARIES AND EXPENSES: 
The Committee recommends total budget authority of $2,420,000,000 for salaries and 
expenses, of which $366,680,000 is derived from fees deposited in the Diversion Control 
Fund, and $2,053,320,000 is provided by direct appropriation. The recommended direct 
appropriation is $35,320,000 above fiscal year 2014 and the request. This increase is 
intended to help DEA offset its necessary pay and non-pay base costs, which the President’s 
budget had proposed be fully absorbed using unspecified administrative offsets. The 
increase is also expected to support DEA’s growing enforcement workload, including 




Based on the evidence presented in this proposal, it is recommended that the 
DEA receive an additional $20 million in discretionary funding to support the 
expansion of the SIU program and associated operational costs.  However, funding 
for the DEA to conduct independent training should be denied since Congress has 
already allocated money for police training in the CARSI and Merida Initiatives.  The 
                                                             




Department of State should be directed to utilize the DEA for its counter-narcotics 
training initiatives in order to better utilize the agency’s experience and regional 
footprint. 
The DEA began the SIU program out of an operational need to have a reliable, 
uncorrupted, partner to work with in Latin America.  By training, equipping and 
working side-by-side with officers in the SIU program, the DEA not only created an 
international law enforcement and intelligence capacity, it inadvertently created a 
sustainable development and justice sector reform program that positively impacts 
rule of law.  The key to this success is the working relationship and oversight that 
DEA Special Agents stationed overseas provide.  While metrics to better measure 
the long-term impact of the SIU still need to be further developed, it is a sustainable, 
practical, policy initiative to assist justice sector reform in Mexico and Central 
America.   
While the scope of the SIU program is clearly limited and a much larger 
training initiative is needed to address the rule of law crisis in Mexico and Central 
America, expansion of the SIU program is a proven policy tool that should be 
integrated as an important part of a larger initiative.  While this proposal will create 
reoccurring costs that will require a permanent expansion of the DEA’s 




counter-narcotics budget and would be less than the amount of unexpended funding 
INL returned to the U.S. Treasury in FY 2013.82  
Training is an invaluable tool to reduce corruption and improve rule of law 
but it requires a continuing relationship and oversight of trained officers to be truly 
effective and have a long-term impact.  The DEA is uniquely positioned to provide 
this critical oversight in Mexico and Central America.  Additional funding to station 
more DEA agents abroad and to expand the SIU program will enhance this capacity, 
reduce corruption and improve training results.  The expansion of the SIU model as 
a policy option has already been suggested by congressional committees and only 
needs to be implemented by approving this budget request. 
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